Confucius and the superorganism by Sarkissian, Hagop
Seeing ourselves as part of a superorganism allows us to understand our 
actions, choices, and experiences in a new light. If we are affected by our 
embeddedness in social networks and influenced by others who are closely 
or distantly tied to us, we necessarily lose some power over our own deci-
sions. Such a loss of control can provoke especially strong reactions when 
people discover that their neighbors or even strangers can influence 
behaviors and outcomes that have moral overtones and social repercus-
sions. But the flip side of this realization is that people can transcend 
themselves and their own limitations.
— Christakis and Fowler 2009
How does one acquire a sense of oneness? An obvious answer is through religion or religious texts. One might read of the notion of Brahman in the Vedanta school of Hinduism— pure con-
sciousness or bliss— which is the unified and singular true nature of reality, of 
which we are but temporary manifestations (apparent but not real). Hence we 
are all ultimately one, though temporarily we are not. Or one might read of 
neo- Confucians thinkers claiming that every creature, every single speci-
men under the stars, forms one body with every other (???????). Of 
course, such notions are quite distant from where I now sit in my office in 
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mid- Manhattan, typing this essay. They are distant in an obvious and trivial 
sense— namely, that they represent ideas written in contexts far removed from 
our own, both spatially and temporally. However, they also advert to meta-
physical beliefs that are difficult to take on board.
Nonetheless, feeling connected to others, as though one is part of a larger 
plan or goal, or feeling a kinship with all living things— these need not stem 
from extraordinary metaphysical views. They might, instead, express values 
that individuals affirm, which factor into their well- being and psychological 
economy— contributing, say, to their overall sense of belonging or meaning. 
But even while this may be true of scores of individuals, it is not obvious how 
affirming one’s values through expressions of oneness might have purchase for 
those who are not inclined to think in these terms, and who might take such 
language as, at best, expressing relatable values using strong metaphysical lan-
guage or, at worst, expressing “heroic” metaphysical beliefs (to borrow a euphe-
mism) using clichéd language.1
In what follows, I will describe a sense of oneness that, while having its roots 
in a tradition of thought far removed from our own, might nonetheless be 
accessible to many persons. It is a sense of oneness that is, admittedly, smaller 
in scope than the two options just canvassed. It is not a oneness with all of 
humanity, let alone with all the creatures under the sky or all the elements of 
the cosmos. Nevertheless, it is recognizably a sense of oneness that transcends 
one’s own person and connects one to a larger whole.
I will be calling this conception that of a superorganism, to borrow another 
phrase, this time from the natural and social sciences, where it finds paradig-
matic application to collectives of eusocial animals— for example, an ant colony, 
which consists of numerous individual members yet which also constitutes 
an entity with properties that go beyond that of any of its members. There are 
obvious and significant discontinuities between ant colonies, on the one hand, 
and human societies, on the other. I don’t mean to suggest that human beings 
are mindless agents, or that human societies are superorganisms in the exact 
same way ant colonies are. Nonetheless, human societies are entities that tran-
scend their individuals. In the words of Borgatti et al., “the idea is that social 
ties can bind nodes together in such a way as to construct a new entity whose 
properties can be different from those of its constituent elements” (Borgatti 
et al. 2009, 894). I will be exploring, then, a conception of oneness not by can-
vassing spiritual views of connectedness or metaphysical views about the ulti-
mate nature of reality, but instead by seeing groups of entities as forming a 
new, super entity. It’s a view that arises when thinking in network or collective 
terms as opposed to node or individual terms.
I find this particular sense of oneness in classical Confucian conceptions of 
society, though without the explicit (and robust) metaphysics of the later neo- 
Confucians. Though this sense of oneness is not stated in explicit terms, it is 
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nonetheless one that can be easily reconstructed out of certain views of indi-
viduals and collectives in classical Confucian texts. I begin with passages from 
the Analects that can be interpreted as containing within them such a sense 
of oneness as superorganism. Later, I present what I take to be stronger evi-
dence of a more explicit kind in the Daxue and Zhongyong chapters of the Liji. 
I then conclude by arguing that thinking of Confucian social and political 
philosophy in terms of a superorganism can be helpful in understanding why 
the entire project may have been ill founded.
The Zhou Superorganism
In Analects 19.22, Zigong, a student of Confucius, is asked the following ques-
tion: whence his teacher’s knowledge of the dao of sage kings of the past, who 
flourished centuries before he was even born (ca. 551 bce)? The answer Zigong 
gives is noteworthy:
Analects 19.22: Gongsun Chao of Wei asked Zigong, “From whom did Confu-
cius acquire his learning?” Zigong replied, “The dao of Kings Wen and Wu has 
not yet sunken into the ground— it still exists in people. Those who are wor-
thy understand its greater aspects, while those who are unworthy understand 
its lesser aspects. There is no one who does not have the dao of Wen and Wu 
within them. From whom did the Master not acquire his learning? And what 
need was there for him to have a formal teacher?”2
The sage kings Wen and Wu, founding figures of the Zhou dynasty, are long 
since dead. Confucius could not learn from them directly, or from any of the 
other towering figures of this era (such as the Duke of Zhou). But their teach-
ings remain embedded in what I’ll call the latent Zhou superorganism that 
remained nascent in the state of Lu. Lu was Kongzi’s home state and where the 
high culture of the Zhou dynasty had managed to persist in spite of the very 
real and precipitous decline of the power of the Zhou kings starting in 771 bce. 
That superorganism might not have been revived were it not for one particular 
individual— Confucius— who would stitch it back together.
Brook Ziporyn (2012) places special emphasis on this passage, and his read-
ing of it bears similarities to my own (even while he does not use the image of 
a superorganism in his explication). As Ziporyn notes, in this passage,
We are presented with a sense in which a certain specific cultural tradition, to 
which special value is attached, is omnipresent within the members of a par-
ticular community. We are told that it can be found everywhere in that com-
munity, but the decisive thing here, the turning of the tables, is that what really 
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actualizes this omnipresence is Confucius himself, that is, his ability to recog-
nize the coherence of these various cultural forms, to ask the right questions, 
to “thread them together,” to borrow a trope he uses elsewhere.
The presence of the particular concerns, values, and projects of Confucius 
is what makes this omnipresence effectively present around him. What actu-
alizes this presence as something readable, the Way of Wen and Wu, is the way 
it is connected to, interacts with, coheres with, the dispositions, cognitive and 
ethical, of a certain human being, Confucius. . . .  And this Way is neither 
purely internal to Confucius nor existing independently outside him. He does 
not invent it ex nihilo, but nor does it simply impose itself upon him. If he were 
not there to see it that way, the fragments of the Way of Wen and Wu, though 
present everywhere, would not cohere into anything intelligible. It is the focus 
provided by his own activity and presence, his own orientation and disposi-
tion of character, that make it come together sustainably and discernibly 
around him, to be seen as, and indeed to genuinely function as, a resource for 
his own particular inquiry. The things out there in the world are neither the 
same as what Confucius sees, nor different from it. He sees an aspect of what 
is there, and by so seeing makes this aspect, as present in many places, cohere 
into a particular presence.
(Ziporyn 2012, 94)
Ziporyn does not speak of a superorganism, nor does he use resources from 
network theory. However, we do see here a sense of a collective that contains, 
within it, knowledge that any particular member lacks, and Kongzi as the per-
son who is able to see its coherence.3 Confucius becomes a new node through 
which the superorganism is reinvigorated. He is able to become a central con-
duit through which its various parts interact and communicate to one another. 
Importantly, Confucius sees himself as playing this precise role.
Analects 9.5: The Master was surrounded in Kuang. He said, “Now that King 
Wen ? is gone, is not culture (wen ?) now invested here in me? If Heaven 
intended this culture to perish, it would not have given it to those of us who 
live after King Wen’s death. Since Heaven did not intend that this culture 
should perish, what can the people of Kuang do to me?”
Networks, Nodes, and Influence
A social network consists of all the connections and ties within a collection of 
individuals, or nodes. A node (or self) is constituted by the larger network 
while also constituting it. To be a self in a network is to be a particular point 
upon which network forces impinge (in both manifest and imperceptible 
ways), while also impinging upon others similarly in turn. This notion finds 
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expression throughout classical texts in the Confucian philosophical tradi-
tion, which often discuss how individuals and groups influence and shape one 
another.
One of the powerful roles that networks play is to build a bridge from the 
local to the global— to bridge from individuals to groups, or from nodes to 
networks— and back again. In this way, explanations can be provided for how 
simple processes at the level of individual nodes and links can have complex 
effects that ripple through a population as a whole. That early Confucians saw 
individuals as deeply affected by their social environments is well known, as 
discussed in a number of recent papers (for example, Hutton 2006, Sarkissian 
2010b, Slingerland 2011). Ziporyn makes similar claims.
Confucius is nonnegotiably a member of a group, prior to any choice, and yet 
at the same time decisively constitutes the nature of the group of which he is a 
part, from which he can only depart in terms of his prior commitment to that 
group, but which nonetheless requires his own present deed to be actualized 
in a particular way. He cannot choose not to be a member of this group, but he 
can choose what sort of group it is that he is a member of. Just which forces of 
world, nature, culture, and deceased semi- personal spiritual powers are con-
sidered to be contributing members to the collective body of which he consid-
ers himself a part depend on his own “take” on the trajectory of the tradition 
he connects to. He is educated in this tradition, and selectively emphasizes 
those aspects to which he, in both the literal and figurative senses, “connects.”
(Ziporyn 2012, 97–98)
For the early Confucians, no person is an independent actor in any interest-
ing sense. The classical texts characterize individuals as acting on their own 
choices and deliberations, and assuming responsibility for the course of their 
lives, while also acknowledging that any particular person’s behavior is continu-
ally shaped by the behavior of others in his or her midst, by the objects and 
variables in their immediate environments and, ultimately, by the various other 
nodes that comprise her larger network of relations. This assumption formed 
the basis of much else in early Confucian thought. Network theory provides a 
way to bring such notion of influence, shaping, and constitution into sharper 
focus, by providing more robust theoretical resources to understand the rela-
tionship between individuals and the collectives in which they participate.4
The key notion representing the influence of individual nodes on other 
nodes in the classical texts is dé ?, which, at its core, refers to a person’s ability 
to influence others through noncoercive means. In the words of A. C. Graham, 
it had traditionally represented “the power, whether benign or baleful, to move 
others without exerting physical force” (Graham 1989, 13). The importance of 
“effective power” or “power over others” in understanding dé is recognized by 
nearly everyone. For example, Arthur Waley translates dé as “moral force” 
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(Waley 1938), Graham as “potency” (Graham 1989), Philip Ivanhoe as “moral 
charisma” (Ivanhoe 1999), Bryan Van Norden as “a sort of ‘ethical force’ that a 
person has, which can have a transformative effect on others” (Van Norden 
2007, 21). In addition, scholars also agree that this power seems, for the Confu-
cians, to be the prerogative of morally upright or charismatic individuals, lend-
ing them authority in the eyes of others. David Nivison was characteristically 
perceptive in noting that the concept of dé “has implications, not easily ana-
lyzed, that make mature and sophisticated moral- philosophical discussion by 
the Chinese philosophers complex and fascinating— even when the word and 
syllable de has been left behind, and these philosophers are talking about rén 
? (“benevolence”), yì ? (“duty”), xìn ? (“trust”), l? ? (“propriety”), liáng zh? 
?? (“moral intuitions”), etc.” (Nivison 1996, 17).
In previous work, I have tried to explicate one sense of dé by discussing the 
attractive power that accrues to individuals owing to the scrupulous way they 
mind their impact over others, including not only their honing the accuracy of 
their moral inclinations and reactions over time (2010a), but also their mind-
ing features of their self- presentation (2010b) and regulating themselves when 
they are the site of others’ scrutiny (2015). The j?nz? (nobleman/ moral exem-
plar) in classical Confucian texts is represented as capable of cultivating him-
self along these lines and thereby wielding influence over others, who find the 
j?nz? to be both agreeable and authoritative— someone to cooperate with or 
yield to. Indeed, a prominent aspect of dé in the Analects— besides its character-
istic power— is its linkage to self- cultivation (xi? ?— for example, 7.3, 12.10, 12.21, 
16.1). Since moving others (or influencing them) to make social and political 
changes was the ultimate goal of Confucius and his disciples, cultivating dé or 
“effective nodal influence” was one of their chief aims. It is discussed in several 
passages in the text.
Analects 4.24: The master said, “One who possesses dé is never solitary; he is 
certain to have neighbors.”
Analects 9.14: The master expressed a desire to go and live among the Nine Yi 
Barbarian tribes. Someone asked him, “How could you bear with their 
uncouthness?” The Master replied, “If a gentleman were to dwell among them, 
what uncouthness would there be?”
Analects 12.19: The dé ? of a gentleman is wind, the dé of a petty person is 
grass— when the wind blows, grass bends.
Analects 2.3: The master said, “Guide them with governance (zhèng ?), regu-
late them with punishments, and the people will evade them with no sense of 
shame. Guide them with dé ?, regulate them with ritual propriety, and the 
people will have a sense of shame and be orderly.”
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These effects flow from one person to another, which is also known as dyadic 
spread (Christakis and Fowler 2009). What can spread from one node to 
another is not just influence or mood or behavior but also information, mate-
rials, or other resources.5
However, there is also hyperdyadic spread, which characterizes the tendency 
of effects to spread from node to node to node outside of a person’s direct social 
ties and thus to ties of those ties. The more someone has ties to others, the more 
susceptible is one to the flows of information within it. Some passages in the 
classical Confucian literature express this relationship between the individual 
and the greater whole as going through several intermediary nodes or subnet-
works, evoking a sense of oneness or unity greater than the self. We find this 
expressed in the Daxue ?? (Great Learning), a chapter in the Liji ?? (Book 
of Ritual), an important early source of Confucian writings.
The ancients who wanted to manifest radiant de first ordered their states.
Wanting to order their states they first aligned their familial clans.
Wanting to align their familial clans they first cultivated their persons.
Wanting to cultivate their persons they first set their minds straight.
Wanting to set their minds straight they first made their intentions sincere.
Wanting to make their intentions sincere they first reached understanding.
Reaching understanding lies in getting a handle on affairs.6
Consequences at the level of the network (ordering the state) are linked to the 
influence of a particular node (the cultivated mind of the ruler, its central 
node). The passage continues:
So you get a handle on affairs and only then reach understanding,
You reach understanding and your intentions become sincere,
When your intentions are sincere your mind straightens.
Your mind straightens and your person becomes cultivated
Your person is cultivated and your family becomes harmonized.
Your family is harmonized and your state becomes ordered
Your state is ordered and there is tranquility under the skies
 From the node of the king to the nodes of the common people, all must take 
the cultivation of their own persons as the root (of everything else).7
It should be emphasized that such scrupulous self- attention was counseled 
not for everyone, but rather for those who sought positions of authority. As De 
Bary notes while discussing this theme in the Analects, “when Confucius 
speaks of the chun- tzu [j?nz?] as someone especially careful and restrained, 
one who is punctilious about not overstepping the bounds of what is right, it is 
not because he expects ordinary men to exercise the same circumspection or 
constrain themselves to the same degree, but because those he addresses have 
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a heightened visibility and potentially more far- reaching influence on others” 
(De Bary 1991, 29). Self- regulation is especially important when one is the main 
focus of an entire group’s attention.
The importance of self- regulation is heightened in proportion to the 
greater impact one can have on others through their shared focus (Sarkis-
sian 2014). Because they occupy a stratum of society that has the possibility 
to influence the whole network, they believe they will be modeled by others, 
and so they perceive themselves from the point of view of the network, regu-
lating their intentions and conduct by anticipating larger, wider network 
effects.
Put another way, if one both understands behavior as being obviously and 
significantly sensitive to immediate situational factors, and if one also wants 
to shape human behavior toward the end of social harmony, then one would 
do well to attempt to control those signals that promoted harmony and mar-
shal them toward this end. So the emphasis on norms of self- scrutiny, personal 
decorum, and cultivated influence is intricately connected with certain 
entrenched views concerning the working of moral psychology.
The Sagely Node
The early Confucians believed in virtue politics— the idea that bringing about 
a state of harmony in the general population required a commitment to plac-
ing virtuous individuals in positions of power. Virtuous individuals would 
affect others through their dé, which would resonate out from the ruling class 
through the rest of the network, binding and shaping the superorganism. Of 
course, the Confucians themselves sought positions of power to embed them-
selves as key nodes within the network, yet a virtuous ruler was vital for the 
Confucian vision to succeed. A truly cultivated, virtuous, and charismatic 
ruler was believed capable of transforming the entire world by sheer power of 
his dé.
Analects 2.1: The master said, “One who governs by means of his dé is compa-
rable to the Pole Star, which occupies its place and receives the homage of the 
myriad lesser stars.”
Analects 8.18: The master said, “Majestic! Shun and Yu8 possessed the whole 
world without even managing it.”
Analects 15.5: The master said, “Someone who ruled without even acting (wu- 
wei ??)— was this not Shun? What did he do? He made himself reverent and 
took his proper position facing south— that is all!”
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Here we find the telltale effects of dé on a grand scale. Rather than simply 
affecting those in his immediate presence, a ruler with dé was thought to affect 
an entire nation.
Indeed, one of the fundamental axioms of network theory is that the oppor-
tunities and constraints of any particular node— the degree to which it is both 
susceptible to network effects and capable of affecting the network— hinges on 
its position within the network (Borgatti et al. 2009, 894). The outsized effects 
of dé noted in the passages can be explained by the fact that they stemmed from 
a central position where resonance was most potent, keyed to the centrality of 
the ruler’s node.
Following Freeman (1978), we can discriminate between three distinct mea-
sures of centrality in networks. The first concerns degree, or the extent to 
which a given node is directly connected to other nodes. The ruler, being at the 
center of the superoganism, is well positioned to be connected to more nodes 
more directly than most any other node in it. The second concerns between-
ness, or the extent to which a node falls between pairs of other nodes within 
the network. The ruler, receiving tribute from the various noble houses in the 
realm, lies in between them all, for the ruler occupies the central node through 
which all resources and information follow. The third is proximity, or the num-
ber of nodes that any other node must go through to reach any other point in 
the network. It is thus a measure of access. The ruler has access to any other 
node through fewer intermediaries than any other node (say, a member of a 
noble house of a particular fiefdom). A ruler with dé, then, would influence and 
transform his senior ministers, who in turn would influence their subordi-
nates, creating a linked chain of virtuous behavior that would be modeled 
down through the ranks of officials to village and clan leaders. Through ritual 
performance, personal excellence, and scrupulous devotion to the superorgan-
ism, the ruler would bind the network together.9
We find this reflected in passages even where the notion of a collective is not 
even salient, and even where the notion of dé is not even tokened. Consider, for 
example, Analects 13.3:
Analects 13.3: Zilu asked, “If the Duke of Wei were to employ you to serve in 
the government of his state, what would be your first priority?” The Master 
answered, “It would, of course, be the rectification of names (zhengming ??).” 
Zilu said, “Could you, Master, really be so far off the mark? Why worry about 
rectifying names?”
The Master replied, “How boorish you are, Zilu! When it comes to matters 
that he does not understand, the gentleman should remain silent. If names are 
not rectified, speech will not accord with reality; when speech does not accord 
with reality, things will not be successfully accomplished. When things are not 
successfully accomplished, ritual practice and music will fail to flourish; when 
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ritual and music fail to flourish, punishments and penalties will miss the mark. 
And when punishments and penalties miss the mark, the common people will 
be at a loss as to what to do with themselves. This is why the gentleman only 
applies names that can be properly spoken and assures that what he says can 
be properly put into action. The gentleman simply guards against arbitrariness 
in his speech. That is all there is to it.”
Here, I suggest that we have a striking example of the effect a single, weighty, 
embedded node can have on an entire network. It’s imperative that informa-
tion is passed along without degradation or noise from this node.
Confucius is, of course, speaking counterfactually. He was not in a position 
to rule. And, as we noted in the quotations at the outset of this section, the ruler 
was not supposed to actively manage the state. Instead, the ruler was meant to 
attract other individuals of virtue to take up positions in his government, man-
ning posts and embedding themselves in positions of influence. For example, 
we find the following passage in “The Doctrine of the Mean,” another chapter 
in the Liji: “Therefore the administration of government lies in procuring 
proper men. Such men are to be procured by [the attractive power of] the rul-
er’s own person. His person is to be cultivated by following the right dào, and 
he cultivates the right dào by means of his humankindness.”10 According to 
this passage, a virtuous ruler attracts good men by his side, who would, in turn, 
work tirelessly for the benefit of the ruler and his people. These ministers would 
be weighty nodes themselves, serving to enable the ruler to exercise his benev-
olent will while also constraining him by advising and exhorting him and thus 
providing for checks on mistakes.
Such a structure would allow the ruler to govern “effortlessly”— by just sit-
ting on the throne (as it were), the heaviest, weightiest, most influential node 
in the network. After all, the ruler occupied the top position of a thoroughly 
hierarchical network system that demanded loyalty to those above, and pow-
erful examples from above might have significant effects below. In the words 
of Bruce and Taeko Brooks, “if the ruler has the right qualities, those below 
will spontaneously acquire those qualities. We might call this the assent of the 
governed; their capacity to respond to good influence” (Brooks and Brooks 
1998, 94).
Moving the Superorganism from the Periphery
We can understand this process of attracting individuals as one of constructing, 
node by node, the state superorganism. However, there was a fundamental 
structural challenge to the hopes of this model working. Becoming good itself 
(and in the first place) required influence from the right kinds of experienced 
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mentors, who were customarily above one in the social hierarchy. If the ruler 
was starkly deficient in virtue (as was the norm), who does he model? There is 
no one above him, no one to whom he ought to defer. Of course, Confucians 
such as Mencius would argue vehemently that the ruler ought to comply with 
his ministers (for example, Mencius 4A1, 6B8), but this was more aspiration 
than reality. In Wm. Theodore De Bary’s memorable characterization, Mencius 
better exemplified “the fearlessness of the teacher in a classroom than that of 
the minister at court or the soldier in battle” (De Bary 1991, 16).11 In practice, the 
Confucians had to defer to (and await recognition from) the rulers of the time, 
and otherwise lacked institutional support to remonstrate with them in any 
effective fashion.
Put another way, this is the problem of moving the superorganism by influ-
encing the central node from the periphery. This highlights a concession or 
severe limitation in the Confucians’ conception of cultivating dé— namely, the 
influence that accrues to an individual node by virtue of his or her position in 
the network. In a hierarchical system (such as the Confucians endorsed), one 
typically holds sway over one’s peers and those beneath one in the social hier-
archy. So it is likely that rulers were largely immune from the example of the 
nobleman, no matter how cultivated, owing to their superior position. The 
ruler would be tone- deaf to influence because others were expected to yield to 
him. Indeed, all of the paradigmatic examples of dé in the Analects have this 
very feature of working down the social ladder— from j?nz? to barbarian, from 
j?nz? to petty person, and from rulers to everyone else.
Experiments on social networks seem to provide us with some vindication 
of this. In an experimental study using a representative sample of 1.3 million 
Facebook users, Aral and Walker (2012) found that younger users of the plat-
form were more susceptible to influence than older users, that men were more 
influential than women, that women influenced men more than they influ-
enced other women, and that influential individuals were less susceptible to 
influence than noninfluential individuals were. Influential individuals cluster 
together in the network, whereas susceptible individuals do not. So influential 
people are instrumental in the spread of information throughout the network. 
Influential people are therefore instrumental in the spread of information 
throughout the network while also, and simultaneously, not being as susceptible 
to influence within it. They are loci of influence. They are sources of potency. 
They drive the superorganism.
De Bary called the problem of influencing bad rulers a key aspect of The 
Trouble with Confucianism (1991). If a system is strictly hierarchical, then who 
leads or guides the person at the apex? Various models were proposed in the 
classical period: Heaven (for the Mohists), the inheritance of the ancient Sage 
Kings (for Xunzi), the Dao (for Laozi). But these are all rather impersonal, 
abstract models. In practice, a ruler occupied power by virtue of occupying the 
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seat at the apex, and transforming him proved to be a thorny and delicate task. 
Indeed, the very fact that Mencius speaks so boldly with the various rulers of 
his time has been taken by some as prima facie evidence of the fictional status 
of these dialogues (Brooks and Brooks 1998). Petty persons might bend to the 
noblemen like grass to wind, but rulers were an entirely different story.
This doesn’t impugn the general model of dé, or the idea of nodes influencing 
networks. However, it must be considered a fatal flaw in classical Confucian-
ism political philosophy. A Confucian nobleman’s goal was to wield influence 
and have real impact over social policies and practices, and knowing that such 
influence was often highly improbable led to much consternation about 
whether or not a Confucian should accept an official title; if one could not hope 
to transform one’s ruler, should one accept the job? “In general, the noble man 
assumes office only when he can hope to influence the rulers. To accept office 
with an unsavory ruler whom one cannot possibly influence to the good is to 
justify the suspicion that one is motivated by a desire for emoluments and 
fame and not by the ideal of service. . . .  [Yet] is it not the duty of the shih 
[scholar- official] to attempt to influence them?” (Schwartz 1985, 112). Seeking 
such influence and then failing at it could easily make one a tool for those in 
power, serving individuals with questionable or even immoral ends. The prob-
lem of wanting to serve and fulfill one’s ethical obligation, but only when 
one can have some real expectation of exerting influence, and only in a way 
that will preserve one’s own integrity, plagued Confucian philosophy from 
the Analects onwards. It is perhaps for these reasons that throughout the 
Analects there is an insistence that it’s OK to be a political loser (so to speak) 
so long as one maintains one’s integrity (for example, 1.1, 1.16, 4.5, 4.14, 11.19, 
14.30, 15.19).12
Finally, it is not at all clear that, even if a virtuous ruler were to take the 
throne, the network model of dé could work on a scale envisioned by the early 
Confucian thinkers. Though Confucian, Mohist, and Legalist texts alike 
emphasize the ruler’s crucial duty to place meritorious individuals in admin-
istrative posts and properly manage the kingdom’s affairs, the means by which 
the ruler was to secure such individuals and assure their performance was a 
matter of dispute. Many, such as Han Fei, would come to doubt that the ruler’s 
moral excellence could serve any useful role in the process of filling adminis-
trative posts and properly managing the kingdom’s affairs.
Hanfeizi: When a sage governs a state, he does not wait for the people to be 
good in deference to him. Instead he creates a situation in which people find it 
impossible to do wrong. If you wait for people to be good in deference to you, 
you will find that there are no more than ten good people within the borders 
of your state. But if you create a situation in which you find it impossible to do 
wrong, the entire state can be brought into compliance. In governing, one 
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must use what is numerous and abandon what is scarce. Therefore, the sage 
does not work on his de, he works on his laws.
(Sahleen 2006, 354)
As others have noted, these and related passages in the Han Fei constitute a 
basic (and forceful) critique of the Confucian view of top- down, dé- inspired 
rulership models. The crux of Han Fei’s criticism seems to be that such mod-
els, resting on the attractive and transformative power of moral example, are 
“impossibly idealistic, because they hopelessly over- estimate the number of 
people who can be transformed and made good through the power of virtue” 
(Hutton 2008, 429). Basing one’s political philosophy on the appearance of such 
a ruler has been described as “ludicrous” (Liu 2006, 188–89). Hence, Han Fei 
and others emphasized clear laws and standards with manifest rewards and 
punishments. Put another way, such thinkers believed it was better to have a 
population that was law- abiding and compliant rather than to wait for a popu-
lation to be transformed to the good because a virtuous ruler sat on the throne.
✳ ✳ ✳
The sage kings were the central nodes of the early superorganisms. So long as 
a sage did not reappear, it could not be fully reconstituted. However, even 
though this ideal would not be realized, thinking of oneself as a node of influ-
ence on one’s network can have purchase for us today. It can serve as a reminder 
that one may continuously exert influence over the broader course of one’s 
social network just by occupying one’s position in one’s own distinctive way. 
We might tend to think of how we influence those around us in volitional 
terms, through discrete, agential actions. The early Confucians remind us that 
this is perhaps an overly simplistic view of things. We cannot be a node in a 
network without shaping it to one degree or other. And some of our networks 
(for example, our classrooms, our students, our families) will be influenced by 
us continually and in significant ways. Herbert Fingarette expresses this point 
nicely in a discussion of ren (what I’ve been translating as humankindness) that 
could just as well be a discussion of dé.
Let us attempt finally to place Confucius’s own way of seeing ren in focus . . .  
and try to find an image that both distinctively and truly reflects Confucius’s 
way of seeing ren. Such an image must suggest a power emanating from the 
actor. . . .  Finally, this power is to be essentially human power; that is, it is a 
power of human beings (when they are truly human) and it is directed toward 
human beings and influences them. . . .  It seems to me that the Western image 
that would serve best is one drawn from physics— the vector. In the case of ren, 
we should conceive of a directed force operating in actions in public space and 
This content downloaded from 142.103.160.110 on Sat, 22 Sep 2018 03:28:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
318 HAGOP SARKISSIAN
time, and having a person as initial point- source and a person as the terminal 
point on which the force impinges. The forces are human forces, of course, not 
mechanical ones.
(Fingarette 1972, 36–37)
Thinking through these issues from the Confucian perspective can serve to 
remind us of the forces that emanate from our own persons, and how they 
might be impinging upon others. This is a first, and necessary, step in uncov-
ering, understanding, and ultimately shaping one’s own dé.
Notes
 1. P. J. Ivanhoe refers to neo- Confucian metaphysics as “heroic” while explicating the 
sense of oneness that can be found in their writings. He explains his choice of term as 
follows: “I mean by [heroic] that such beliefs would be very difficult for a modern per-
son to embrace, since they cannot be reconciled with views that are now widely 
accepted by science. I find these traditional metaphysical views implausible, just as I 
find many of Plato’s views about value or Aristotle’s views about human nature, 
untenable” (2015, 231–32). I take it, then, that “heroic” may be amenable to a euphe-
mistic reading. See Ivanhoe (2016) for further discussion of this term, in particular 
how it also reflects the strong ethical demands that such a metaphysical view entails.
 2. Translations follow Slingerland 2003, with some modification.
 3. Ziporyn draws support for his reading here by a particular interpretation of tian ?, 
or “Heaven,” as a kind of superorganism as well. As Ziporyn notes, the way that tian 
is presented in the Analects reflects some middle position between referring to a per-
sonal agent as found in the Mozi (a contemporary rival school of thought), on the one 
hand, and referring to a thoroughly naturalized conception of nature or natural pro-
gression as we find in the Xunzi (a later Confucian text), on the other (2012, 95). He 
cites Ivanhoe for inspiration: “There are a number of ways in which one might attri-
bute agency but not personality to Heaven. One way would be to see Heaven as a kind 
of collective will— a conception that as noted earlier can be found in the early Zhou 
sources. A jury can make judgments and assign guilt without being a single person or 
being of any kind. At a minimum though, Kongzi and Mengzi did regard Heaven as 
what Daniel Dennett calls ‘an intentional system’ ” (Ivanhoe 2007, 217n11). Ziporyn 
develops this idea in a particular direction, arguing that heaven “would be conceived 
along the lines of the collective body of ancestors . . .  thought to maintain their per-
sonalities, their concern with specific purposes in the world, and their consciousness 
of their earthly life in inverse proportion to the length of time they had been dead” 
(Ziporyn 2012, 95).
 4. So far as I know, no one has used resources from network theory to understand clas-
sical Confucian thought, though Karyn Lai has noted the appropriateness of thinking 
of the relationality of selfhood in the tradition in node- and- network terms: “The idea 
that people within a community participate in its moral life and enrich each other is a 
theme of profound significance in Confucian thought. In the Confucian scheme, 
each individual is a necessary and distinct node within a web- like network of different 
relationships. Engagement with others in society presents opportunities for self- 
fulfilment and development in that context. The harmonies that are created rely on 
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the concerted effort of people who are fine- tuned to each other and who are mutually 
responsive” (Lai 2006, 155). Similar statements are likely to be found in the secondary 
literature.
 5. Cf. Analects 6.30: “Now he who exemplifies humankindness— by wanting to establish 
himself thereby establishes others, by wanting to advance himself thereby advances 
others.”
 6. ?????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????My translations of the 
final two lines follow a suggested reading by Steve Angle and Justin Tiwald.
 7. ??????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????
 8. Mythical heroes and sage- rulers of antiquity, venerated by the Confucian and Mohist 
schools.
 9. A ruler might quickly cultivate his dé by bestowing favors on his subjects, who would 
in turn feel “generosity- gratitude” toward him (Nivison 2002, 234). These feelings of 
gratitude and indebtedness would be amplified by socialization forces in Chinese cul-
ture demanding that individuals display gratitude and respect whenever favors are 
bestowed upon them. In this way, a natural sense of gratitude would be amplified by 
social norms and serve as powerful sources for a ruler’s accumulating moral power 
through a grateful and lovingly obedient population.
 10. ?????????????????????
 11. The problem extends to other social relations as well. Consider the family: children 
may remonstrate with their parents when appropriate, but if their counsel falls on deaf 
ears they must desist and obey without resentment (Analects 4.18). Indeed, a filial son 
must cleave to the ways of his father even after the latter has passed away, and for the 
entirety of the three- year mourning period; only then could he consider departing 
from his father’s example (Analects 1.11).
 12. There is the separate question of whether the fact that most of Confucius’s disciples 
failed to achieve office impugns Confucius’s teachings. Confucius himself was a failure 
in this regard, and at times appears to admit that his work is doomed (5.27, 14.38). 
Elsewhere, he expresses doubts as to whether Heaven has abandoned him and his 
mission (9.9, 11.9), and is subject to mocking by his contemporaries (3.18, 14.32). The 
issue of his disciples’ failures has received comparatively little scholarly attention, 
but is given excellent treatment in Wong and Loy (2001).
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